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Ian S. Lustick, *Paradigm Lost: From Two-State Solution to One-State Reality* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 232 pp. Hardback, $27.50.

Ian Lustick is arguably the foremost scholar of Israeli society and politics in the US. Beginning with his *Arabs in the Jewish State* (1980), the first critical academic engagement with the question of Israel's Palestinian citizens, he has usually identified and explored key issues and concerns ahead

of other scholars. Until not too long ago, he was an ardent believer in the two-state solution (TSS) to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, so Lustick's (2013) abandonment of this 'paradigm' in a *New York Times* article created quite a stir. In his new book, Lustick provides the theoretical and empirical arguments for this change of mind.

In his work on Jabotinsky's doctrine of the 'iron wall', Lustick had already laid out the logic that would make the TSS impossible. Jabotinsky, as is well known, called for an 'iron wall' policy toward the indigenous population of Palestine until they resign themselves to the reality of Zionist settlement and are willing to make peace with the settlers. However, once that point is reached, what incentive would the Zionists, or Israel, have to change their attitude? As the common saying in Israel goes, we can't make peace with the Palestinians while they are fighting us, and we have no reason to make peace with them when they are not.

While the logic of the 'iron wall' would be sufficient to explain the failure of the TSS, three additional factors, Lustick argues in *Paradigm Lost*, were also at play. The first factor is what he calls 'Holocaustia': the way the Holocaust came to be understood in Israel, as well as the lessons drawn from it—reflected in the slogans 'never again' and 'the whole world is against us'—and its use in Israel's diplomacy.

The second factor is the "Israel lobby's hammerlock on U.S. foreign policy" (p. 55), which led to the paralysis or defeat of the few American politicians who were genuinely interested in bringing about the TSS. The source of the lobby's power is political funding, rather than votes. According to Tom Dine, AIPAC's executive director between 1980 and 1993, "AIPAC-directed contributions comprised 'roughly 10 to 15% of a typical congressional campaign budget'" (p. 59). AIPAC's hold on American policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also brought about the defeat of Israeli moderates, who had for decades pinned their hopes on American pressure to 'save Israel from itself'.

The third and most important factor, of course, is the success of Religious Zionism, spearheaded by Gush Emunim and aided by all Israeli governments since 1967, in implanting about three-quarters of a million Jewish settlers in the West Bank, making separation of that territory from Israel a political impossibility.

Whether the TSS died in 1967, in the face of the Labor Party's inability to agree on a course of action with regard to the newly occupied territories; with the Rabin assassination in 1995; or at the Camp David summit in July 2000, holding on to that dead paradigm obscures the reality of the single state that has exercised sovereignty between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River for the past 53 years. Lustick quotes with barely concealed pleasure a number of prominent 'two-staters' who express their

belief in the TSS while admitting they have no idea how it could come about. He also dismisses the whole array of in-between proposals, which are really TSSs in disguise: confederation, parallel states, 'one country, two states,' and so forth.[1]

Given the reality of one state, what kind of state is it, and what kind of state can it be? Right now, with about 40 percent of the population of Greater Israel stateless and denied all rights, there is no way of avoiding its designation as an apartheid state. But, however, one might wish to describe what it is *not*: "No state whose policies toward half the people under its control include overwhelming rates of incarceration, heavy and constant surveillance, a strangulating system of pass laws and checkpoints, collective punishment, and bloody violence can convincingly claim the mantle of democracy" (p. 123).

The major thrust of the book is that it is a mistake, and perhaps has always been a mistake, to think of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in terms of a 'solution'. As Meron Benvenisti argued decades ago, for better or worse this kind of inter-ethnic conflict can only be managed, it cannot be solved. Lustick ends on a somewhat optimistic note, however, hoping that once the annexation of the occupied Palestinian territories to Israel becomes formal, and the aim of the Palestinian struggle shifts from national self-determination to equal citizenship rights, a dynamic in which Jews and Arabs work together toward democracy and civil rights might emerge. This hope is based, *inter alia*, on the pronouncements of a number of right-wing annexationists, including President Reuven Rivlin, to the effect that after annexation Palestinians should be made full citizens of Israel, in one way or another. But, as Lustick is very well aware, those pronouncements should be taken with a ton of salt.

Another ray of hope Lustick identifies is the BDS movement, which is focused "on realizing Palestinian rights to equality and nondiscrimination under international law and the laws of the state that governs them" (p. 129). Paradoxically, he also finds hope in President Trump's "policies and plans [which] appear to include no political rights for Palestinians, [but] may at least move the debate from contemplation of the impossibility of two states … to posing questions about the nature of [the] one state that exists in the present" (p. 130).

There is no question that *Paradigm Lost* is a path-breaking book, anchoring the credo of the 'one-state reality paradigm' in a foundational text. But the book is not free of problems. There are a number of small but still irritating factual errors that should have no place in a book by a scholar of Lustick's stature: the first elections in Israel were held in 1949, not 1948 (p. 41); Yossi Beilin was never deputy prime minister—for a few months in 1995–1996 he was a junior minister in the prime minister's office, a very

different kind of position (p. 76); the Camp David summit between Barak, Arafat, and Clinton took place in July 2000, not in 1999 (p. 101); and, if it matters, Gershon Shafir did not earn his doctorate in Israel but, like Lustick himself, at UC Berkeley (p. 110). A more serious problem, for which the author is not responsible, of course, is that the book lacks an index and a list of references, which makes working with it a little too difficult.

The first of July 2020 was supposed to be the date on which, according to Prime Minister Netanyahu, the process of annexing part of the West Bank would begin, under the auspices of Trump's peace plan. As this review is being written, no steps have been taken in that direction, nor have any real plans for implementing annexation been presented. From the perspective of Lustick's new 'one-state reality' paradigm, any kind of annexation should be welcomed, since it would narrow the gap between formality and reality. At the moment, however, it seems that the reality of an unprecedented health and economic crisis will take precedence over formalizing Israel's *de facto* annexation of the West Bank.

Yoav Peled
Tel Aviv University

NOTE

1. For the whole range of such proposals, see Ehrenberg and Peled (2016).

REFERENCES

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